IN THE HIGH COURT OF BELIZE

CLAIM No.96 of 2025

BETWEEN:

MOSES BARROW

1st Claimant

ALBERTO AUGUST

2nd Claimant

AND

ELECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES COMMISSION

1st Defendant

ATTORNEY GENERAL

2nd Defendant

Appearances:

Mr Matthew L. Morris, attorney-at-law, for the claimants
Mr Hector D. Guerra, attorney-at-law, for the 1st defendant
Ms Samantha Matute, Deputy Solicitor General, with Ms Imani Burgess, Crown Counsel for the 2nd defendant

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21 October 2025

4 November 2025

JUDGMENT

Judicial Review – Application for leave – Whether the issue raised by the claimants for judicial review is moot and of only academic interest – Whether the permission application should be dismissed for unreasonable delay – Duty to act promptly in judicial review matters

[1] **HONDORA, J.:** The claimants seek permission to challenge through judicial review the decision made by the first defendant, the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC), on 25 February 2025, which allocated the colour red to, and authorised its use by, all United Democratic Party (UDP) candidates who participated in the 12 March 2025 general election under the UDP banner.

[2] The lead claimant is Mr Barrow, and he is the only one who deposed to and filed affidavits in support of the permission proceedings. Consequently, in my decision, I shall, as relevant, refer to the claimants either as Mr Barrow or the claimants.

[3] I shall refer to the EBC as such.

I. Procedural background

[4] The claimants filed their application on 3 March 2025 seeking permission to apply for judicial review and for an interim injunction restraining the EBC from "issuing use of "Traditional U.D.P. Red" for the General Election to persons other than United Democratic Party candidates, namely including *(sic)* members of the "Alliance for Democracy "Party".

[5] The 3 March 2025 application was placed on my list on Thursday, 10 July 2025, and was brought to my attention by the court office on Monday, 14 July 2025. On the same day at 9:47 AM, I caused an email to be sent to Messrs. Pitts Pitts and Associates Law Firm, attorneys-at-law, who were listed in the application as the claimants' attorneys. The Attorney General's chambers were copied on that and all subsequent communications. In my communication, in addition to enquiring whether the claimant still sought an interim injunction, I informed Messrs. Pitts Pitts and Associates that I would hear the application on July 16, 2025.

[6] In their response on the same day at 12:01 PM, Messrs. Pitts Pitts and Associates Law Firm informed the court that they no longer represented the claimants and had no further instructions in the matter. In my reply to Messrs Pitts Pitts and Associates, I pointed out that they had not applied to be removed from the record as attorneys for the claimants, and that they needed to confirm whether there was

still a live issue arising from the application for leave and an injunction.

[7] At 3:17 PM on the same day, the court office received an email from Mr Barrow in which he stated that he had been "blindsided" by his attorneys in that they had informed him that morning that they "would not be able to continue [representing] him in [the] matter." Mr Barrow requested an adjournment of the hearing set for 16 July 2025 and indicated that he was "now scrambling to find new counsel". Mr Barrow also stated that:

> "As to the clarification relating to the interim injunction, the claimants will no longer be seeking interim injunctive relief as the Court has rightly noted the purpose for which the interim injunction was sought appears to have been overtaken by events."

[8] I considered whether it was appropriate for Mr Barrow's application to be decided on the papers, but ultimately decided against that course. I concluded that it was in the interests of justice for Mr Barrow to be allowed to secure alternative legal representation and to amend his notice striking out those orders he no longer sought (see CPR 56.4(6)). Additionally, since Mr Barrow had requested interim relief and considering the apparent merits of the substantive relief he sought, I decided that the Attorney General should be given notice of the permission proceedings. I made this decision in accordance with and considering CPR 56.4(2) to (4), which provides:

> (2) The judge may give permission without hearing the applicant.
>
> (3) However, if–
>
> (a) the judge is minded to refuse the application; or
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> (b) the application includes a claim for immediate interim relief; or
>
> (c) it appears that a hearing is desirable in the interests of justice, he or she must direct that a hearing in open court be fixed.
>
> (4) The judge may direct that notice of the hearing be given to the respondent or the Attorney General.

[9] I vacated the hearing scheduled for 16 July 2025. I also issued Orders for the filing and service of, among others, the defendants' answer to the amended application, the parties' written submissions and hearing bundles. I set the matter down for hearing on 21 October 2025.

[10] Mr Barrow filed an amended application on 30 July 2025, removing those remedies he and his now co-applicant, Mr Alberto August, were no longer pursuing. Notably, in the amended application, the claimants were listed as Moses Barrow and Alberto August. This suggested that Mr Barrow (as the lead claimant) had changed the capacity in which he was suing and seeking relief. In other words,

Mr Barrow was no longer suing in both his personal and representative capacities. No explanation was provided for that change. In the application filed on 3 March 2025, Mr Barrow initiated the permission proceedings in his own name and in a representative capacity, i.e., representing what he referred to as "UDP Executive members/candidates."

[11] Additionally, Mr Barrow amended some of the averments made in his first affidavit, dated 28 February 2025. In my Order of 15 July 2025, I gave the claimants limited leave to amend their application, i.e., I directed the claimants to:

(a) use only the first and last names of each person involved in the proceedings as a claimant;

(b) use the first and last name of the lead claimant; and

(c) strike through all reliefs, which the claimants no longer sought.

[12] It also appears that, as of 30 July 2025, Mr Barrow and Mr August were self-actors since no attorney had filed any notice indicating that they had assumed agency as of that date.

[13] Further and notably, Mr August did not sign the 30 July 2025 amended application, nor did he file any affidavit in support of the application. In addition, Mr Barrow did not assert in his affidavit that he was filing the amended application on behalf of and with the consent of Mr August.

[14] Furthermore, as noted by the defendants in their pleadings and submissions, Mr Barrow's did not comply with the following provisions of the Senior Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules (CPR), i.e., (i) CPR 30.2(e) on the form of the affidavit; and (ii) CPR 30.5(1)(d) on the need for a jurat denoting that the affidavit was deposed correctly before a person authorised to administer oaths.

[15] On 26 August 2025, Mr Mathew Morris, Esq, filed a notice affirming that he was the claimant's appointed legal representative. That notice did not comply with CPR 62.2 because it did not specify his address and telephone number. Additionally, he neither indicated that he had served a copy of his notice on the parties to litigation nor filed a certificate of service for it.

[16] At the case management hearing held on 10 October 2025, I directed Mr Morris, who is not based in Belize, to designate a corresponding law firm in Belize. Corresponding law firms are essential for attorneys who appear before the courts but do not have a physical office in Belize. Depending on the circumstances, the court may need to summon the parties and their legal counsel to appear on short notice, during which the local attorneys will personally appear in place of their instructing attorneys.

Additionally, in the absence of a corresponding law firm, filing hard copies of pleadings and written submissions can be complicated, especially when an in-person hearing is scheduled at short notice. Notably, in my order of 15 July 2025, I instructed the defendant, not the claimants, to file a hearing bundle because the claimants were, at the time, unrepresented. It was more convenient and practical for the defendants' lawyers to do so. It is, of course, the claimant's responsibility to file hearing bundles (see CPR 39.1) and to do so in close cooperation with all parties involved in litigation. I am grateful to Ms Burgess, Crown Counsel, for the bundles filed in this matter.

II. The claimants' leave application

[17] As outlined above, the claimants seek permission to challenge the decision made by the EBC on 25 February, which allowed all persons contesting the March 2025 general election under the UDP banner to use the colour red to identify their party affiliation for purposes of those general elections.

[18] It might seem strange at first glance that the claimants would contest the EBC's decision granting the UDP the use of the colour red, which the claimants assert the party has used in general elections since its founding in 1973. However, the UDP has recently been troubled by ongoing factionalism, a point on which the claimants, in their various pleadings and supporting documents, appear to both approbate and reprobate. It is uncontroversial to state that there is an ongoing unresolved leadership tussle within the UDP between Mr Barrow and Mrs Tracy Panton.

[19] As appears from the pleadings, Mr Barrow accuses Mrs Panton of having formed a separate political party called the Alliance for Democracy (AFD). As reflected in the following three cases, Mrs Panton states that the AFD is not a separate political party and is a grouping of like-minded members of the UDP, i.e., (i) ***Barrow and Ors v Panton and Ors***, Claim No. 661 of 2024 (No. 1); (ii) ***Barrow and Ors v Panton and Ors***, Claim No. 661 of 2024 (No. 2); and (iii) ***Barrow and Ors v Panton and Ors***, Claim No. 661 of 2024 (No. 3).

[20] For his part, Mr Barrow's case is partly predicated on the decision in ***Barrow and Ors v Panton and Ors***, Claim No. 661 of 2024 (No. 1), a matter in which this court issued an interlocutory order directing Mrs Panton and those of her supporters to return possession, management and control of the UDP's headquarters to Mr Barrow and his then Executive Committee. I refer to the then executive because, following the March 2025 elections, Mr Barrow lost his parliamentary seat and is no longer the leader of the opposition in parliament. In addition, Mrs Panton, who was re-elected as a member of

parliament under the UDP banner, is now the Leader of the Opposition in parliament. That said, the question of leadership of the UDP remains unresolved.

[21] In his application for permission to apply for judicial review, Mr Barrow indicated that if leave were granted, he would seek several declaratory orders and an order of certiorari, i.e., an order setting aside the decision made on 25 February 2025 (a) granting "Tracy Panton's 15 Alliance for Democracy candidates use of "traditional UDP red" for use in the 2025 Belize General Election; and (b) allowing "Tracy Panton's 15 Alliance for Democracy candidate[s] to refer to themselves as "UDP candidates" when they are not…"

[22] In support of his leave application, Mr Barrow stated that when the EBC reached its decision on 25 February 2025, it considered irrelevant factors, and that the decision was irrational, unreasonable, and ultra vires. He also stated that, in addition to acting in bad faith, the EBC violated his "constitutional right to run as a candidate in free and fair elections" and the rules of natural justice. Mr Barrow further indicated that he intended to seek damages, including punitive damages, for the breaches of his constitutional rights.

[23] Mr Barrow attached to his leave application copies of four letters sent by him and his attorneys to the EBC, the contents of which, as far as material, I propose to restate.

[24] In the first dated 6 February 2025, Mr Barrow wrote to the Chairperson of the EBC, Mr Oscar Sabido Puga, asking him to urgently clarify through the media that a report published on the same day in a Hot off the Press news article that UDP candidates, including those aligned with Mrs Panton, would be permitted to use the colour red was not accurate. In the third paragraph of his letter and after referencing the Hot Off the Press article, Mr Barrow stated:

> "Since reading it, I have made inquiries about it and Mr. Alberto August, Opposition Commissioner on the EBC, who attended the EBC where the matter was discussed on 2/5/25 has informed me that contrary to what has been published in fake news outlet Hot Off the Press, no decision was made to assign the colour red to the Alliance for Democracy Party led by Tracy Panton."

[25] The second, dated 10 February 2025 and related to the same Hot Off the Press article, was sent to the EBC by Mr Barrow's attorney, Dr Christopher Malcolm. On behalf of Mr Barrow, Dr Malcolm requested the EBC to clarify through an official publication that the information in the criticised article was inaccurate. He stated, amongst other things, that it could not be true that the EBC had entered

the realm of party politics and concluded that there were two officially recognised factions in the UDP, and that colours traditionally used by the UDP could now be adopted by "two competing factions".

[26] The third letter, dated 23 February 2025, is in the name of Mr Barrow. In that communication, he informed the EBC that there is only one UDP and that the party's constitution prohibits factionalism. Mr Barrow indicated that Mrs Panton had engaged in factionalism and was expelled from the party. He asserted that Mrs Panton "formed her Alliance for Democracy Party and should be recognised as such."

[27] The fourth letter, dated 25 February 2025, was sent to the EBC by Mr John E. Alexander Nembhard of Nembhard Law, another of Mr Barrow's attorneys. In his communication, Mr Nembhard stated that there were no factions within the UDP and that the UDP's Central Executive Committee decides who represents the party in elections. Mr Nembhard indicated that the UDP had chosen Jose Uc Espat, not Mrs Panton, to represent the UDP in the Albert constituency.

III. The defendants' case

[28] The EBC, through its chairperson, opposes the claimants' leave application on several grounds, including that: (a) the claimants' application is procedurally defective; (b) the issue raised is moot as the 25 February 2025 decision has been overtaken by events; (c) the claimants' unreasonably delayed in challenging the impugned decision and they had alternative remedies, which they failed for unexplained reasons to invoke; (d) the claimants' application is procedurally defective; and (e) the grounds on which the decision is challenged do not disclose any arguable case with a realistic prospect of success.

IV. Issues arising

[29] The parties' respective cases raise the following issues:

(a) whether the issue raised by the claimants for judicial review is moot and of only academic value; and/or

(b) whether the claimants' application should be dismissed for unreasonable delay; and//or

(c) whether the claimants' application for leave is procedurally defective; and

(d) whether the claimants should be granted permission to judicially review the decision taken by the EBC on 25 February 2025, and if so, on which grounds?

[30] I propose to address these issues in turn.

(a) Whether the issue raised by the claimants for judicial review is moot and only of academic value?

[31] The defendants argue that the claimants' leave application should be dismissed because the 25 February 2025 decision, which the claimants seek to challenge via judicial review, has been overtaken by events. They contend that the issue, namely the validity of the 25 February 2025 decision, is now effectively moot and only of academic value. The defendants base their argument on the fact that the claimants aimed, or arguably could only have aimed, to challenge that decision in relation to the elections held on 12 March 2025. They also assert that the claimants did not contest the validity of the elections held on 12 March 2025, which resulted in the formation of a new government and the election of members of parliament.

[32] The claimants did not, in their reply to the defendants' opposition to the leave application, nor in their written and oral submissions, dispute the defendants' contention that the 25 February 2025 decision, in relation to which they seek specific declaratory and prerogative orders, if leave is granted, is, for practical purposes, moot and that the orders sought would serve no useful purpose.

[33] In agreement with the defendants, it is my view that the issue of the legality of the decision made by EBC on 25 February 2025 is now moot. Determining at this late stage whether the impugned decision was valid at the time it was made serves no useful purpose, as the decision was preparatory for the 12 March 2025 elections, which have already taken place and against which there have been no electoral challenges. It is clear from any reading of Mr Barrow's 28 February 2025 affidavit and the correspondence that he and his attorneys sent to the EBC that he was seeking to have the latter change its 25 February 2025 decision allocating the colour red to those aligned with the AFD for purposes of the March 2025 general election.

[34] To put it differently, the claimants' pleadings clearly indicate that Mr Barrow intended for the EBC to overturn the impugned decision before the March 2025 general election, either on its own motion or as a result of a court order. Notably, Mr Barrow has not, in these proceedings, stated, nor was it argued on his behalf, that he sought the certiorari and declaratory remedies for any reason other than the March general election. The claimants have also not provided a reason why that 25 February 2025 decision should, in principle, be considered and set aside after the 12 March 2025 general election. Relatedly, it has not been argued that the UDP possesses any trademark rights to

the colour red, which the party can assert and enforce and was effectively asserting and enforcing as of right.

[35] Notably, in para. 11 of his 28 February 2025 affidavit, Mr Barrow complained that the 25 February 2025 decision will "harm our candidates in the General Elections of 2025, and if allowed to persist may cause damage [] which cannot be easily remedied or in some cases [will be] beyond repair."

[36] In summary, the claimants' pleadings do not allow for any conclusion other than that they have no practical need for, and (from a public interest perspective) no useful purpose would be served by, the declaratory and prerogative orders they seek.

[37] As noted by counsel for the defendants, the principle of law outlined in ***R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Salem*** (1999) 1 AC regarding the exercise of discretion in appeals involving public authorities, when there is no longer any lis between the parties, is equally applicable to this court's exercise of discretion in an application for permission to judicially review a decision made by a public authority. In ***ex parte Salem***, Lord Slynn of Hadley, who wrote the lead judgment and with whom the other Law Lords agreed, stated:

> "…in a cause where there is an issue involving a public authority as to a question of public law, your Lordships have a discretion to hear the appeal, even if by the time the appeal reaches the House there is no longer a lis to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties inter se…
>
> The discretion to hear disputes, even in the area of public law, must, however, be exercised with caution and appeals which are academic between the parties should not be heard unless there is a good reason in the public interest for doing so, as for example (but only by way of example) when a discrete point of statutory construction arises which does not involve detailed consideration of facts and where a large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future."

[38] In ***Belgrave v Judicial and Legal Services Commission***, Claim No. Civ 689 of 2022, Chabot J approved Lord Slynn's dicta in ***ex parte Salem*** and stated that courts will dismiss judicial review claims where there is no longer a live issue between the parties, even if the matter raised pertains to an important public law issue (see para. 33). In support, Chabot J referenced the case of ***James v The Speaker of the House of Assembly of the Commonwealth of Dominica***, Claim No. DOMHCV 2010/199 and DOMHCV 2010/200, at para [106]. I would, on the same point, also refer to the persuasive opinion expressed in ***Rampersad v Imbert***, Claim No. CV2021-01982.

[39] In ***R (Heathrow Hub Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport*** [2020], the Court of Appeal stated, at para [208], that:

> "It is well-established that Courts should not opine on academic or hypothetical issues in public law cases other than in exceptional circumstances where there is good reason in the public interest for doing so."

[40] In ***Caribbean Civil Practice 2011***, at Note 34.30, it is stated:

> "Permission to make a claim for judicial review will be refused if the matter is only of academic interest as between the parties unless there is a good reason in the public interest for hearing it, as for example, where a discrete point of statutory construction arises which does not involved detailed considerations of facts and where a large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future."

[41] I note that in his 15 July 2025 email to the court, Mr Barrow acknowledged that the interim relief he sought—namely, restraining the EBC from what he called "issuing use of "Traditional U.D.P. Red" for the General Election to persons other than United Democratic Party candidates… including members of the "Alliance for Democracy" Party—had been overtaken by events and that he would no longer pursue the relief. Implicit in that decision, which Mr Barrow communicated to the court, is a concession that the purpose for which he sought to challenge the 25 February 2025 decision was to have that decision reversed before the date set for the general election.

[42] Drawing on the above, I uphold the defendants' plea and refuse to grant the claimants permission to judicially review the EBC's 25 February 2025 decision. I do so on the ground that the 25 February 2025 decision was superseded by events, namely the holding of the 12 March 2025 general election, and the interim and final reliefs sought by the claimants as set out in their application for leave lost practical relevance as of that date. Following the general elections, there is no longer any sound practical reason to adjudicate on the issue. Additionally, the claimants did not plead nor demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances that justify the determination, at this late stage, of whether the EBC's 25 February 2025 decision was lawful, and none are self-evident.

(b) Delay

[43] I would also dismiss the claimant's permission application on the additional ground pleaded by the defendants of unreasonable delay. It is noteworthy that the claimants did not, in their pleadings and submissions, dispute the defendant's plea that the leave application was tainted by unreasonable delay, nor did they argue that, notwithstanding the delay, the court ought, in the public interest and/or

for proclaimed exceptional reasons, permit them to judicially review the 25 February 2025 decision.

[44] The general rule is that an application for permission to apply for judicial review must be made promptly. This rule is codified in CPR 56.5, which provides:

> (1) In addition to any time limits imposed by any enactment, the judge may refuse permission to grant relief in any case in which the judge considers that there has been unreasonable delay before making the application.
>
> (2) When considering whether to refuse permission or to grant relief because of delay the judge must consider whether the granting of permission or relief would be likely to–
>
> (a) cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice, the rights of any person; or
>
> (b) be detrimental to good administration.
>
> (3) **An application for permission to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly** and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. [Emphasis added]

[45] It is clear from Mr Barrow's 28 February 2025 affidavit (see para. 26 above) that he was aware from 25 February 2025 of the decision taken by the EBC permitting all persons seeking to contest the general elections under the UDP banner to do so using the colour traditionally associated with that party, i.e., the colour red. Relatedly, Mr Barrow and his then co-claimants filed their permission application electronically on 3 March 2025. However, hard copies of that application do not appear to have been brought to the attention of the court office to enable it to place the same before the Chief Justice for allocation to a judge.

[46] According to Mr Sabido, the EBC was served with a copy of the application on 10 April 2025.

[47] Although the claimants and their attorneys could have contacted the court office to bring the application for leave and the interim injunction to the court's attention, they did not do so. Similarly, no explanation has been provided in these proceedings for that omission.

[48] Furthermore, since Mr Barrow was seeking an interim injunction related to the March elections and a final order, if permission was granted, setting aside the EBC's 25 February 2025 decision, it follows that the claimants should have pursued their application in a manner that ensured it was heard urgently, with the leave and substantive judicial review applications heard on an expedited basis. In short, although open to them, the claimants did not, for unexplained reasons, request an urgent hearing – a fact supported by the fact that the claimants did not file a certificate of urgency (see CPR

11.6(3)). Additionally, no explanation has been provided for these decisions regarding the claimants' approach to prosecuting their application for permission.

[49] Given the circumstances, there is not any option available to the court save to hold the claimants to the options they chose in prosecuting their application.

[50] Although the claimants filed their leave application within three months of the impugned 25 February 2025 decision, I share and adopt the opinion expressed by the Privy Council in the case of ***Fishermen and Friends of the Sea v Environmental Management Authority*** [2018] UKPC 24, in the context of section 11 of Trinidad and Tobago's Judicial Review Act, which is in pari materia to CPR 56.5, that "there is a duty to act "promptly" regardless of the three-month limit."

[51] In my view, acting "promptly" means more than just filing an application for leave on the electronic case management system and leaving the matter to lie dormant. An applicant seeking permission to apply for judicial review has a duty to bring their application to the court office's attention and to request that it be placed before a judge for consideration, either on the papers or on hearing both parties. In other words, an applicant seeking permission in a judicial review matter has a concomitant duty, i.e., in addition to the duty to file their leave application promptly, to prosecute their application with the requisite degree of promptitude, and any unreasonable and/or unexplained delay may result in their application for permission being denied.

[52] In these proceedings, it was the court, through the enquiry made on 15 July 2025 to Messrs Pitts Pitts and Associates Law Firm, not the claimants, that revived what was essentially a dormant application for permission to judicially review the 25 February 2025 decision. While CPR 56.4(1) provides that a judicial review permission application must be considered forthwith by a judge of the High Court, it is the applicant's responsibility to ensure that the relevant application is brought to the court office's attention. This is what leads to the matter being allocated to a judge for swift consideration.

[53] On the facts of this matter, since it is not explained in their pleadings or submissions, the claimants' failure to adequately and effectively prosecute their application can only be regarded as inexcusable. Likewise, I have not been given reason to rule otherwise, and none is evident from the pleadings.

[54] I am also of the view that, considering the delays that have characterised the claimants' prosecution

of their leave application, it would not serve the interests of good administration to permit them to judicially review the 25 February 2025 decision, which was preparatory for the 12 March 2025 elections and that resulted in (a) the election of new members of parliament; and (b) the establishment of a new government. There were no electoral challenges to those elections, including on the grounds set out in the claimants' intended substantive judicial review application. Arguably, permitting a judicial review challenge at this late stage would amount to an order permitting a collateral challenge to the validity of those elections outside the electoral challenge system set out in the Representation of the People Act.

[55] I should also add that although there are practice differences between English and Belizean law in relation to judicial review (see the opinions expressed in ***Attorney General v Isaac*** [2018] UKPC 11 and ***Belize Bank Ltd v Association of Concerned Belizeans***, BZ 2008 CA 2), I am of the view that the following eminently sensible observation by Lord Diplock in ***O'Reilly v Mackman*** [1983] 2 AC 237 remains apposite that:

> "The public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by the decision."

[56] In summary, and as set out above, I would dismiss the claimants' application for permission to judicially review the impugned 25 February 2025 decision on the grounds of unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecuting the same.

V. Conclusion

[57] In light of the above, I do not need to consider whether the claimants' proposed grounds are arguable and have a realistic prospect of success (see the test set out in ***Sharma v Browne-Antoine*** [2006] UKPC 57). I also note that the defendants have not sought costs. Consequently, I do not propose making an order for costs.

[58] Drawing from the above, I rule as follows:

1. The claimants' application for permission to judicially review the Elections and Boundaries Commission's decision of 25 February 2025 is dismissed.
2. No order as to costs.

Mr Justice Hondora
Judge
High Court
Civil Division